History

4th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment, in The Great War

In World War I, The Duke of Cambridge’s Own (Middlesex Regiment) formed a total of 49 battalions from its pre-war establishment of four regular, two reserve and four territorial battalions. The regiment was awarded a total of 81 battle honors and five of its officers and men were awarded 5 Victoria Crosses for gallantry. The regiment lost 12,270 casualties during the Great War.

The 4th Battalion was based at Devonport at the outbreak of war on 4 Aug 1914 as part of 8th Brigade in 3rd Division in 2nd Corps commanded by Maj Gen Horace Smith-Dorrien and Maj Gen Hubert I.W. Hamilton, respectively. On 14 Aug 1914, the battalion landed in France at Boulogne as part of the British Expeditionary Force. The battalion was the first British battalion to engage the German forces in the war at the Battle of Mons. Along with the 4th Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers, the 4th Middlesex held up 8 attacking German battalions until overwhelmed its artillery fire and manpower. The battle decimated the units’ ranks and before the end of the year, the 4th Battalion was pulled out of the line. In 1915 the battalion was reformed and on 14 Nov 1915 assigned to the 21st Division of Lord Kitchener’s “New Army” in 63rd Brigade. On 1 Jul 1916, the 21st Division attacked Fricourt on the Somme front. A and B companies 4th Middlesex were beaten back within 5 minutes of the start of the assault and forced to retreat. After regrouping, they attacked again and managed to gain some ground but with only 40 men reaching the first objective. The remaining 2 companies were also decimated trying to push further into the German lines. By 3 July, the 4th Middlesex had suffered 540 casualties and was pulled from the line Again. On 8 Jul 1916 it transferred with 63rd Brigade to 37th Division. The battalion took part in most of the major offensives and battles on the Western Front until the end of the war, including the war of attrition waged on the Somme front until Nov 1916. On Armistice Day, 11 Nov 1918, it was in the same formation and located at Caudry, south-west of Solesmes, France.

Mobilization and Embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force.

If an analysis be made of the War efforts of the Cities, Towns  and Counties, which go to form the United Kingdom, it will be found that from a military standpoint no county can claim to have done more during the years 1914—1918 than the County of Middlesex. It might be said that the County, and London, the greatest City in the World, could hardly have done otherwise. But it must not be forgotten that until pre-war days, the Shires produced the greatest number of recruits for the Army and Territorial Force, leading to the pardonable supposition that in war time London and the Country of Middlesex might be expected to put forth the maximum civilian effort leaving largely to the Shires the task of raising the bulk of, whatever additional military forces were necessary to augment the standing Army. The military efforts of London and the County of Middlesex were, however, prodigious. To say nothing of the Service Battalions of the New Army raised for war purposes, the Territorial Forces grew out of all proportion to their original strength. Three Regiments, the Royal Fusiliers, the Middlesex and the London (Territorials), were extended to an altogether extraordinary number of battalions, which before the war ended reached a combined total of not less than 100 battalions. We are, however, only concerned with the Middlesex Regiment (The Duke of Cambridge’s Own), to which the name Die-Hards is now frequently given from the proud soubriquet earned by the 1st Battalion in the Peninsular War.

When war was declared between Great Britain and Germany on the 4th August, 1914, the Middlesex Regiment numbered ten * battalions, four of which were regular (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th), two Reserve (5th and 6th), and four Territorial (7th, 8th, 9th and 10th).

The 1st Battalion (the 57th Foot) was stationed at Woolwich under the command of Lieut.-Colonel B. E. Ward. The 2nd Battalion (the 77th Foot) was at Malta and formed part of the Mediterranean garrison; Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Hayes commanded the Battalion. Of the 3rd and 4th Battalions, the former was in India-in the 8th (Lucknow) Division and stationed at Cawnpore-while the latter was quartered at Devonport, one of the four battalions which formed the 8th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division, then in the Southern Command. The 3rd Battalion was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel E. W. R. Stephenson and the 4th by Lieut.-Colonel C. P. A. Hull.

The Headquarters of the two Reserve Battalions-the 5th (Royal Elthorne Militia) and the 6th (Royal East Middlesex Militia)-were at Mill Hill, where also the Depot of the Regiment was situated. Lieut.-Colonel C. S. Collison commanded the 5th Battalion and Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Barker the 6th Battalion. The Depot was under the command of Major W. D. Ingle. The four Territorial Battalions constituted the Middlesex Infantry Brigade of the Home Counties Division, then part of the Eastern Command. The 7th Battalion (Lieut.-Colonel E. J. King) had its Headquarters at Hornsey; the 8th (Lieut. – Colonel W. Garner) at Hounslow; the 9th (Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Blumfeld) at Willesden Green; and the 10th (Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Johnson) at Ravenscourt Park. The Middlesex Infantry Brigade was commanded by Colonel W. R. Clifford, and the Home Counties Division by Major-General J. C. Young.

This fine Regiment was therefore able to put into the field, immediately war was declared and mobilization had been ordered, at least 10,000 officers and men, well-trained, eager for battle, well-equipped and endowed by past generations with glorious traditions of esprit de corps and devotion to duty.

To those who do not know the derivation of The Die-Hards it may be stated that the name was given to the Regiment by its own comrades of Wellington’s Army of the Peninsular Wars. It was conferred on the 57th Foot after the Battle of Albuhera, and had its origin as follows:- In the battle of Albuhera, dangerously wounded on the ridge which was the key position of Wellington’s Army, then being heavily attacked and outnumbered by French troops under Soult. Refusing to be carried to the rear, he lay in front of the Regimental Colours, encouraging his men and calling out to them” Die Hard, 57th, Die Hard! ” From that day the Regiment was dubbed by its comrades of Wellington’s Army The Die-Hards. And it will be seen how, over a hundred years later, in the year 1915 another gallant officer of the Regiment died with the old cry, “Die Hard,” on his lips.

The circumstances under which war was declared, and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Germany, are now well-known and need not be repeated, and we are immediately concerned with the issue of orders to mobilise, the mobilisation of the Army and the transfer of the British Expeditionary Force to France and Flanders.

4th August – War Declared

A state of war was declared to exist between Great .Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on the 4th August, 1914.” Seven hours previously (at 4 p.m.), when it was evident that war was inevitable, the British Government had given orders for the mobilization of the Army and the Territorial Forces; the Naval Reserves were also called out. In Devonport, mobilizations orders reached the 4th Middlesex at 5.25 p.m., and the Battalion Diary records that at 5.4-5 p.m. (20 minutes later) an official roll showing all officers (23) fit was dispatched to the War Office. The first day of mobilization was the 5th August, and thereafter proceeded rapidly and smoothly until the morning of the 8th, when all companies under Company Commander paraded for inspection.

During the day the Regimental Colours were sent to Mill Hill (the Depot), and late at night (at 10.45 p.m.) mobilization was reported complete. For the next three days the Battalion carried out training, and several long route marches were made.

13th August

On the morning of the 13th the Battalion (in Brigade) entrained at Devonport for Southampton, and, on reaching Southampton Docks, embarked during the afternoon and early evening on board the Mombasa, putting out to sea later “for an unknown destination.” The rapid and secret transfer of the British Expeditionary Force, under the command of General Sir John French, from England to France was one of the early marvels of the War, for it was not until the British public read newspaper accounts of the arrival of British troops at Boulogne that anything was known of the silent departure of our little Army.

14th August.

It was about midday on the 14th when the Mombasa arrived off Boulogne and slowly nosed her way into the harbour, then crowded with craft of every description. Disembarkation proceeded almost immediately, and as the troops stepped ashore the quays were crowded with Boulannais, who for several days past had spent most of their time gaping open-mouthed at the arrival of transport after transport full of troops and munitions of war, which came into the harbour, discharged their human burdens rapidly, and quickly disappeared again in the direction of England. Then, as the troops formed up and marched off through the narrow, crowded streets to the Rest Camp on the hills above the town, the excited populace broke bounds, thrust presents of flowers and all sorts of things into the hands of the British soldiers with cries of “A bas Guillaume!” “Coupez la gorge!” and similar bloodthirsty sentiments, and begged as souvenirs buttons or cap-badges. It was a coincidence that a hundred and twenty-one years previously (in 1793) the old 57th Foot landed on the Continent, also on the 14th of the month, though the month was September instead of August and the port Ostend and not Boulogne. « And it is also worthy of note, from an historical point of view, that the British Force which landed at Os tend in 1793 did so in order to uphold the signature of the British Government to the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which guaranteed the rights of the Dutch over the Scheldt, just as in 19I4 the British Expeditionary Force landed

at Boulogne to honour the signature of Great Britain to the Treaty of London, 1839, which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and to which the Governments of France and Germany had also appended their signatures. In 1793, however, the British Forces were arrayed against France, where as in 1914 they stood by her side, to repel the German invasion.

15th August

Throughout the 15th, the 4th Middlesex remained in the Rest Camp above Boulogne, but at 12.15 a.m. on the 16th the Battalion again entrained for “an unknown destination.”

How great a space of time, how many terrible, troublous years 15TH AUGUST were to pass, ere battalions of the Regiment once more set foot in a French coastal town, m route for England! How much precious blood had been spilled and how many brave and gallant souls had gone to their deaths ere, at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of the year 1918, the” Cease fire” sounded!

Aulnoye, a small village, south of Pont-sur-Sambre and east of the Foret de Mormal, was the” unknown, destination” of the 4th Middlesex, and here the Battalion arrived at 12 noon, detrained, and marched off at 3.30 p.m. to Taisnihes, four miles south of Aulnoye. For the concentration area allotted to the British Expeditionary Force was”  between Maubeuge and Le Cateau, about twenty-five miles long from north-east to south-west and averaging ten miles wide.”

In Taisnieres the Middlesex billeted, and with them in the same village were the three other battalions of the 8th Infantry Brigade, i.e., 2nd Royal Scots, 2nd Royal Irish Regiment, 1st Gordon Highlanders, and Brigade Headquarters. And here, for a while, it is necessary to turn from the concentration of the 1st and Und Corps in order to explain how it was that the British Expeditionary Force came to be on the left flank of the French Armies, then in line from approximately the Swiss Frontier to Charleroi. Although in pre-war days no definite written agreement existed between France and Great Britain, whereby the latter was bound to send troops to assist the French in repelling an unprovoked attack by Germany, the British Government had more than once allowed France to believe that in the event of war British troops would be sent across the Channel. Proof of this may be found in the formation of an Expeditionary Force,” which had existed (at least on paper) for several years prior to 1914.

The manner in which the British Government decided to employ this Expeditionary Force is thus described in the Official History (Military Operations) of the War:-

“On 5th and 6th August, two meetings, attended by the principal Ministers, including Lord Kitchener, who became Secretary of State for War on the 6th, and by the leading members of the Staffs of the Navy and Army of Britain, assembled to consider the conduct of the War. The exact state of affairs at the moment was that Great Britain, France, and Russia were at war with Germany; that Belgium had been wantonly attacked but was making a better defense than had been expected; that Austria was at war with Serbia only; and that Italy was neutral. The main military questions to be considered were the” employment and disposition of the Expeditionary Force, questions which were complicated by the delay in mobilization. It was determined first that the Force, less the 4th and 6th Divisions, should embark for the Continent. In order to reduce the chance of a German landing in force interfering with this move, the Secretary of State decided that the 18th Infantry Brigade of the 6th Division, then at Lichfield, should move to Edinburgh, and two infantry brigades of the 4th Division should proceed to Cromer and York, in each case accompanied by some artillery. The IIth Infantry Brigade of the 4th Division was already at Colchester. Five Cyclist battalions and eventually the Yeomanry Mounted Division were also sent to the East Coast. The rest of the 6th Division was to remain in Ireland.

“Then came the final decision as to the destination of the Expeditionary Force. In view of the attack on Belgium, had the British contingent been of a size adequate for independent operations of a substantial character, there would have been much to be said in favour of making Antwerp the base of its military operations; but as it was so small, and as Antwerp, owing to part of the Scheldt being Dutch territorial waters, would have to be reached after disembarkation at Ostend and other ports, and operations in the north might involve separation from the French, the suggestion was not followed. There remained the area already considered with the French-namely, that around Le Cateau and Avesnes. Certain military opinion, however, was against a concentration of the British Forces in any area in advance of Amiens. Finally, it was agreed to leave the decision with our Allies, the French.”

The Council then broke up, having decided, amongst other things, ” to embark ultimately five, but for the present only four, of the divisions and the Cavalry Division of the Expeditionary Force, to commence on the 9th.”

In presenting his official report to the French Government, Marshal Joffre later stated: “The directions for concentration did not mention the place eventually reserved for the British Army. In the event of its arrival, its employment was looked for at the place which should be especially reserved for it, on the left of the line of the French Armies, which it would thus prolong.” And that is how the B.E.F. came to concentrate in the area between Maubeuge and Le Cateau.*

20th August

The 4th Middlesex was busily engaged in company training and in route-marching at Talsmeres, preparatory to moving up to the position assigned to the B.E.F. in the line of battle. On the 20th August, the 8th Infantry Brigade moved from Taisnieres to new billets, 2nd Royal Scots to St. Aubyn, 1st Gordon Highlanders to St. Remy and the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment and 4th Middlesex Regiment to Monceau. At 8.30 p.m. on the same date, preliminary Divisional Orders were received containing instructions for the march to Maubeuge. The concentration of the B.E.F. was virtually complete, and Sir John French was ready to move his force northwards in accordance to the general strategic plan.

The French plan of operations (or rather the modified plan) had begun to take shape about the 16th of the month. In the original scheme of operations the French General Staff had laid down plans for two offensives, one between the wooded distinct of the Vosges and the Moselle below Toul, and the other north of the line Verdun-Metz. This plan was based on the supposition that the Germans would attack across the common frontier between France and Germany. On the other hand, the German plan (Graf Schlieffen’s) provided for a sweep through Belgium with a strong right wing in an Endeavour to envelop the French armies from the west and drive them up against the Swiss frontier.

The French offensive in Alsace had already begun (and   as making headway) when news of the advance through Belgium of strong German forces  compelled General Joffre to change his plans in order to meet the threat from the north against his  left wing. He therefore stopped his offensive in Alsace, gave orders for the attack between Metz  and the Vosges to be of a secondary nature, whilst the main attack was now to be made through Luxembourg and Belgian Luxembourg, striking at the flank and communications of the German  forces which had crossed the Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier, thus hoping to break  the enemy’s centre, then fall on his right wing with the Fifth French Army, British Army and  Belgian Army (in the order given from right to left) and roll it up towards the common frontier  between Belgium and Germany. The British line of advance was to be by way of Soignies in the general direction of Nivelles, i.e., first a north-easterly movement followed by a turn eastwards. On the evening of the 20th, British G.H.Q. issued orders for the movement northwards to take place during the next three days. The 5th Cavalry Brigade to move on the 21st to the neighborhood of Binche, the right of the British line, the Cavalry Division marching level with  t, but on the left, and proceeding to Lens on the 22nd; the IInd Corps on the 21st and to reach the line Goegnics-Bavai, and the 1st Corps the line Avesnes-Landrecies. On the 22nd the IInd Corps as to move north-westwards to a line from Mons westward to Thulin, the 1st Corps north- eastwards to the line Hautmont-Hargnies; the wheel eastward to take place on the 23rd.

 21st August

Before dawn on the morning of the 21st the troops paraded. 21st August. The Cavalry had already gone forward when the 8th Infantry Brigade, forming the advanced guard of the 3rd Division, set out at 5:30 a.m., followed by the 7th and 9th Infantry Brigades; the 5th Division was in rear of the 3rd and the 1st Corps behind the 2nd Corps.

The early morning was misty, but when the atmosphere had cleared the sun poured down with merciless severity upon the marching infantrymen. The way lay through Maubeuge, where the Inhabitants gave the troops a hearty welcome and provided much needed refreshment. Five miles north of the town was the village of Bettignies and here, about I p.m., the 8th Brigade went into billets, having covered 15 miles since early morning. The troops had marched well, but the feet of the reservists were still tender, which, added to the fact that their boots were new and in many instances ill-fitting, was responsible for 5 men falling out of the ranks of the 4th Middlesex.

The Brigade then formed an outpost line two miles north and north-east, two platoons of “D” Company of the Middlesex with troops from    other battalions being detailed for this duty. About five miles west of Bettignies lay the old battlefield of Malplaquet, now overlooked by the outposts of the 9th Infantry Brigade on the left of the 8th Brigade.

21st – 22nd August

At nightfall on the 21st August, the 3rd Division (on right) occupied the line Bettignies-Feignies-La Longueville; the 5th Division (on the left) the line Houdain-St. Waast-Gommegnies; the 1st (right) and the 2nd (left) Divisions of the 1st Corps had moved up to the line Avesnes-Landrecies.

Certain intelligence had reached G.H.Q. throughout the day; hostile cavalry with some infantry and guns had been located by British airmen, south-east of Nivelles; other German cavalry divisions had been reported on the line Ghent-Audenarde and between Charleroi and Senefte; the main German forces were said to be on line extending from Grammont, through Enghien, Nivelles, Genappes and Sombrefte to Charleroi. The Fifth French Army (Lanrezac), on the right of the B.E.F., was in contact with infantry of the Second German Army (von Biilow along the whole line of the river Sambre, from Tamines to Pont a Celles.

Just before midnight on 21st, G.H.Q. issued orders for the next day’s march: the IInd Corps was to occupy an outpost line from Givry (inclusive) through Harmignics to the Bois La Hallt by 12 noon, and Nimy and the line of the Mons Canal westward as far as the bridge south of Pommerceul (inclusive) not later than I p.m. As soon as these outposts had been established, the cavalry (acting as a screen whilst the IInd Corps was moving forward) would withdraw the 5th Cavalry Brigade to Binche and the Cavalry Division to the left of the IInd Corps. On completion of these moves the 3rd Division Would hold the right and the 5th Division the left of the IInd Corps front.

The night of the 2Ist-22nd August passed without incident. At 3 a.m. the 4th Middlesex Regiment was ordered to form the advanced guard of the 3rd Division during the move northwards on the 22nd. The Battalion paraded early and marched off along the Mons road, followed by the remaining units of the 8th Brigade, to which the XL Brigade, R.F.A., had been attached. The 4th Middlesex and the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment were ordered to entrench and hold the line Nouvelles-Harveng, towards Havay, facing eastwards, whilst the remainder of the 8th Brigade and XL Brigade, R.F.A., were held in reserve, first near Asquillies, and subsequently near Belian Station, in order that the Cavalry Division might withdraw westwards through the infantry. The Middlesex had already marched five miles when a halt was called and the order given to “charge magazines with 10 rounds.” All ranks by now were in a state of excitement. Mons was in sight, and as the troops marched along the road they were given eggs and eatables of all kinds by the eager population. Many of these Belgians had never seen a British soldier, for not since Waterloo had Great Britain sent troops to Flanders.

Later in the afternoon 8th Brigade Headquarters issued orders to the Middlesex and Royal Irish to hold the line, road junction at Faubourg Barthelemy Gust east of  Mons)-Harmignies-Givry; the former Battalion to move to the northern and the latter to the southern part of this line, which faced north-east. G.H.Q. had reported that a hostile force of all arms was advancing on Bray and was engaging the British cavalry.

Again at 5 p.m. orders were received from 3rd Divisional Headquarters to “throw the line forward and northwards thus left at Nimy, holding the Canal bridges (I) immediately north of Nimy, (II) at Lock No. 5, (III) near Obourg Station.” (The 4th Middlesex Regiment was detailed for this): “right at St. Symphorien and Villers-St. Ghislain” (these two places to be held by the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment) …. “The following orders were also given:-Ist Gordon Highlanders to hold and entrench the eastern slopes of Bois La Haut from road junction at Faubourg Barthelemy to road junction 300 yards northeast of Splennes (inclusive): 2nd Royal Scots to continue the line to high ground near Harmignies Station.” After issuing these orders 8th. Brigade Headquarters and XL Brigade, R.F.A., went into billets at Mesvin.

22nd August

Meanwhile the Middlesex had gone forward to take up the1r outpost lines at the bridges. The four companies, were disposed in the following positions:-” D Company on the night at the two bridges near Obourg Station, ” B ” Company was on the left of “D “-in touch with the 4th Royal Fusiliers. “C” Company just east of the Convent Talong the Obourg- Mons. road, “A” Company holding a line of houses prepared for defensive purposes, south of the railway between Obourg and Nimy. Lieut.-Col. (then Captain) G. L. Oliver said of his corps (” C “): “ “ Company

were well dug in in section and platoon trenches Just behind a hedge stretching from a road to the end of the hedge-frontage about 350 yards. Next to the road on its right the hedge became a garden wall and this was loopholed and strengthened.

“A” section was placed back on the road to protect the right rear of the Company as it was not in touch with any other Unit.

” On the left of the Company were the Maxim Guns and on the left of these was “A” Company, occupying amongst other things some houses. There was a thick wood on ” C ” Company ‘ s front and in front of this in the line of the Canal was” D” Company. ” B ” Company was on ” D ” Company’s left and in touch with the Royal Fusiliers.

“Behind “C” Company was a Convent surrounded by very high unclimbable railings or wall and in the. N.W. corner were the stables.” Battalion Headquarters were m a quarry north of the Obourg-Mons road.

The Battalion now set to work to throw up entrenchments, but had hardly begun when a party of Uhlans fired on “D” Company, which returned the fire. No one was hit, but the Battalion had (all unconsciously) established the fact that the 4th Battalion Middlesex Regiment was the first; British infantry unit to fire on the Germans in the Great War. A little later a German Taube was observed hovering overhead and was fired on by the troops, but flew away undamaged.  A little later a German Taube was observed hovering overhead and was fired on by the troops but flew away undamaged. At night fall on 22nd August he 8th Infantry Brigade held a line from VIllers-St. Ghilam-St. Symphorien and Nimy, joining up on the latter flank with the 4th Royal Fusiliers of the 9th Infantry Brigade. The 7th Infantry Brigade was in reserve.  The 5th Division was on the left of the 3rd along the line of the Mons-Conde Canal. The 1st Corps was even then still on the road, to take up its position on the right of the IInd Corps. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was at Binche and Allenby’s Cavalry Division the western flank of the B.E.F.

Thus on the. night of the 22nd August, Sir John French’s  Army was approximately on the line assigned to it, i.e., on the left flank of the French Armies, ready to advance and attack the enemy according to General Joffre’s scheme of operations.

 

THE BATTLE OF MONS

23rd – 24th August, 1914

22nd August

At a conference held at Le Cateau during the evening of the 22nd August, Sir John French announced that the projected British offensive would not take place; for during the late afternoon information had reached him which disclosed a somewhat alarming position on his right flank, i.e., the Fifth French Army (General Lanrezac) on the line of the Sambre. Air reconnaissances had discovered at least two German corps attacking Lanrezac along the Sambre, and to these reports others were added: the French centre had been driven back: the X French Corps had retired to the line St. Gerard-Biesme- Gerpinnes: the III French Corps had fallen back to a line from Gerpinnes, westward to Jamioulx: only the XVIII French Corps on the left of the Fifth Army remained in its original position, echeloned to the rear between Marbaix and Thuin: Sordet’s Cavalry Corps had moved nine miles south of Binche, preparatory to marching to the left flank of the B.E.F.

What had happened? Namur, upon which the Allies had  pinned their faith, i.e., that it would delay and disorganise the German advance, was falling rapidly under the awful fire of the enemy’s huge siege howitzers, which blew stone masonry to atoms and smashed steel cupolas with demoralising ease. The fortress had been invested by the enemy and the triangle Givet-Namur-Charleroi broken.

It must therefore have appeared to Sir John French that instead of embarking on offensive operations he would very soon be on the defensive.

About 11 p.m. on the night of the 22nd, a French Staff officer brought a request from General Lanrezac that the British should attack the flank of the German forces which were pressing the Fifth French Army back from the Sambre. In the face of large numbers of the enemy on his front (whose strength was unknown, though vaguely guessed at) it was impossible for Sir John to agree to the suggestion, but he promised General Lanrezac that he would remain in his position along the Mons-Conde Canal for 24-hours, which action would protect the left of the Fifth French Army. Sir John French’s role, therefore, was to delay the advance of the enemy, and, as will be seen later, on the 4-th Middlesex of the 8th Infantry Brigade and the 4th Royal Fusiliers

(9th Infantry Brigade fell the maintenance of what was without doubt the most dangerous and difficult part of the whole British line-the Mons-Obourg salient.

 23rd August

When dawn broke on Sunday, the 23rd August a mist hung over the battlefield-to-be, and a thin rain was falling. The British Cavalry were early astir, reconnoitering the bridges east of Mons, i.e., at Binche, Bray, Havre~ and Obourg. While the mist still clung to the ground, the G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade withdrew the 2nd Royal Irish from their exposed positions at St. Symphorien and Villers-St. Ghislain to the Faubourg Barthelemy, in reserve. This withdrawal still further accentuated the dangerous position held by the 4-th Middlesex. Moreover, a brigade of Field Artillery (XLth), which, after a reconnaissance, had taken up position about the Bois La Haut, found it impossible to cover the Middlesex if the latter was attacked from the north, the only possible field of fire being N.E., E., and S.E.

At 6 a.m. shots were exchanged between” D ” Company of the Middlesex, posted at the Obourg Bridge, and German Cavalry. The Fusiliers shot a man of a hostile patrol at Nimy, whilst further west along the Canal, near Pommerceul, the D.C.L.I. captured two German cavalrymen; these were the first encounters between British infantry and the enemy on the 23rd August.

About 7 a.m. a Field company was ordered forward to prepare the bridges over the canal along the front of the 8th Brigade for demolition, but they arrived too late to effect their purpose, and the bridges were, unfortunately, left intact, enabling the enemy to pass his troops across.

Sometime between 8 and 9 o’clock, shells began to fall along the line held by the Middlesex and Royal Fusiliers. The machine gunners of the former battalion, observing a German battery commander  unlimbering his guns m the open, about 1,500 yards away, quickly compelled him to seek other positions.

About 9 a.m. hostile infantry attacks, supported by heavy artillery fire, began, enemy movement developing from a northeasterly to a south-westerly direction. Gradually all round the salient the enemy’s troops could be seen pressure forward to the attack’ and to the utter astonishment of the British Tommy, the German advanced in close formation, shoulder to shoulder. Little they knew that they were advancing against troops whose

Marksmanship was second to none; for soon there as a roar of “rapid” rifle fire, and the machine-guns of the Middlesex and Royal Fusiliers began to tear gaps m the ranks of the Intrepid enemy. They were brave fellows, those Germans, their outstanding fault being their ignorance of the prowess of the British infantryman with the rifle, and for that fault they paid dearly. Orders to the Middlesex and Royal Fusiliers holding the salient had been to maintain “a stubborn resistance,” and this they proceeded to do, clinging to their positions with great tenacity. The enemy, foiled in his first attempt, now began to advance more warily, working across the front in small parties With the object of forming up under cover of the woods for a flesh attack.

Meanwhile the whole line west of the salient was becoming involved in the battle, for the wheel of von Kluck’s Army, as in gradual progress, and contact with his troops all along the line of  the Canal was becoming general. It was obvious, therefore, that the salient must either break his progress or else be broken.

At 11 o’clock the line still held, but the 4th Middlesex had appealed for reinforcements, and some of the .2nd Royal Irish were sent up to assist in holding the lime of hastily dug trenches, whilst the machine-gunners of the Irish Battalion joined those of the Middlesex north of the Obourg-Mons road. The possession of every inch of ground between Obourg and Nimy was stubbornly contested, but about noon the Germans were observed working round in rear of the Middlesex, and the latter were compelled to fall back to the neighbourhood of Point 62; the heavy hostile artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, opposed only by British rifle fire, had done its work. The Germans were now across the Canal west of .Obourg. and had reached the line of the railway. From this point, having been taught by bitter experience the ~heel madness of advancing m massed formation; they came on m extended order.

Another appeal from the Middlesex for reinforcements brought up the remainder of the 2nd Royal Irish to Point 62 on the left of the former battalion. From the high ground north of the canal the German gunners were able to observe the movements of these two battalions, and kept them under very heavy shell-fire. By sheer weight of numbers the enemy’s infantry, covered by

artillery fire, was able to work forward, so that about 2 p.m. both the 4th Middlesex and 2nd Royal Irish were driven from Point 62 back on Mons, the 9th Infantry Brigade on the left of the

Middlesex falling back at the same time.

The machine-guns of both battalions were by now in difficulties; the machine-gun officer of the Middlesex had been wounded, but pluckily “carried on.” In front of “C” Company and the Machine-gun Section the Germans had brought up six machine-guns. With fine devotion, the machine-gun officer sent a message to the O.C., “C” Company, offering to cover the withdrawal of the latter if he wished. Shortly after the former officer and one of .his gunners were wounded, and he had no option but that of staying .and continuing the fight. Calling for six volunteers to stay with him, and sending the remainder of the Section back, this little band of men, in the old Die-Hard Spirit, prepared to sell their lives dearly.

The main body of the Royal Irish was again forced to retire (about 5 p.m.), and by that time those of the 4th Middlesex Regiment who had remained in the line had been overwhelmed; many of their rifles had been rendered useless, sand having clogged the breaches.

The turn of the gallant band of machine-gunners came next. The water in the gun-jackets was by now boiling furiously but the last rounds were fired away before the end came.

Lieut:-Col. (then Captain) Oliver’s story of the Battle of Mons, so far as it concerns” C” Company, of the 4th Middlesex (which company he commanded) is as follows :_

” The Battle opened by a German shell hitting the roof of the Convent, the next shell fell within two yards of my left trench and after that, shelling was general in “A” Company’s house, machine Gun’s and “B” Company’s area. Later Germans began coming through the wood and crossing the opening” B” and. in S.E. direction also appearing at “A.”

None approached my trenches directly across the open, but great t damage was done to those crossing at “B” and at point “A.”

“In the meantime, men approached me from the wood and these were seen to be our own men from” D” Company. They joined me. Soon Germans were reported at “D” and .I went to my right to investigate and got a Company of Royal Irish sent up from somewhere to hold my flank, but this Company retired soon after, then the Germans got well round my right returning to my left I found the Machine Guns had been captured and that Germans were about point “E.” Shortly after this I, decided to retire, but the only way was through the Convent garden. I first attempted to get my horse from the stables, but found this occupied by Germans. I then ordered a retirement by Platoons through trees up to the Convent Gate, where my servant, a gallant fellow, blew in the locks of the Gates with rifle shots, getting wounded by a splinter back in doing so. On passing through the garden and emerging by another gate, I found Germans to be in occupation of the wall at “X Y,” and I accordingly came under cross fire from” X Y” and” D” direction. I dashed with my platoon to the Bank in the road and under cover of this and fire from there, the other Platoons dashed across the open hollow for safety. .

” At Brigade Headquarter 2, I found the Colonel and Battalion Headquarters (who had given me up for lost) and the remainder or remnants of ” A ” and” B ” Companys, though many of these. At that time were in the town of Mons.”

The remnants of the 4th Middlesex got away, passing through the Gordons, and, taking the first road to the westward, eventually reached Hyon, whence the march was continued to Nouvelles (about six miles). Here, in a stubble-field alongside the road, the 4th Battalion bivouacked. “We called the roll, as well as we could, without any lists except “C” Company. We numbered about 275 [the number being increased afterwards by stragglers coming in]; our transport was not with us, so we had to manage as best we could for grub. As far as we were concerned, the fighting finished about 4- p.m.” Our list of casualties after the fight was 14 officers and 453 in killed, wounded and missing, but this number of N.C.Os. and men was reduced somewhat by over 100 men turning up later who got astray.”

Amongst the officers, Major W. H. Abell (commanding “A” Company), Captains J. E. Knowles and K. J. Roy, and Lieuts. J. R. M. Wilkinson and K. P. Henstock were killed. Major W. H. C. Davy (commanding” B ” Company), Capt. H. E. L. Glass (commanding” D ” Company), Lieuts. L. F. Sloane-Stanley (M.G. Section), L. J. Graham-Toler, and E. R. Rushton were wounded and taken prisoner, together with Lieuts. H. A. Cartwright, G. C. Druce, L. H. O. Josephs, A. B. W. Allistone and the Battalion M.O., Capt. Terry, R.A.M.C.

 

THE RETREAT FROM MONS

24th – 25th August, 1914

Disillusionment and suffering often go hand-in-hand with the realisation of a dream. For many years before 1914 the British soldier had dreamed of the day (which he was frequently being told was surely coming) when he would find himself ranged in battle against the Germans: the enemy had similar dreams. And if the records of that first clash of arms are carefully studied-German as well as British – it will be seen that out of that first encounter at Mons there emerged that wonderful feeling which possessed the British soldier throughout the whole war, that given equality in numbers, he was a better man than the German. And on that first night of battle, the

23rd August, 1914, confidence and a firm belief in his ability comforted him as he lay, weary from marching and fighting, fighting and marching, his poor tired body aching in every limb, as he tried to snatch a few short hours of rest before dawn. The horrors of that first day had disillusioned his mind of the “grandness of war,” but in suffering he had gained strength.

23rd – 24th August

On the night of 23rd August the general feeling amongst regimental officers and the rank and file in the fighting line was that the Battle would be continued on the morning of the 24th. But shortly after 11 p.m. the senior staff officers of the Ist and IInd Corps and Cavalry Division were summoned to G.H.Q. at Le Cateau, and there they were told that it was the intention of Sir John French to make a general retreat southwards for about eight

miles to a line running from east to west from La Longueville, through Bavai and four miles beyond the latter to La Boiserette : a front of about seven miles. The right of the new line would be five miles west of the French fortress, Maubeuge. The Corps were to retire in mutual co-operation.

Reports of the retreat of the French on his right, of the strength of the enemy on his front and the danger of envelopment of his left, had reached Sir John and he had decided to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak.

24th August

The retirement began at dawn on the 24th,’*’ the 1st Corps

convening the movements of the IInd Corps, the cavalry simultaneously making a demonstration. The enemy had already opened fire with his artillery against the right of the IInd Corps (3rd Division), but otherwise the 8th Infantry Brigade was little troubled, and at 6 a.m. the G.O.C., 3rd Division issued orders to the Brigade to withdraw from Nouvelles. The German infantry

made no advance, and at 8 a.m. the 8th Brigade began its march in a south-westerly direction on Genly.

The 4th Middlesex apparently obtained but a brief respite in their stubble-field, for before it was light they marched off (or all that was left of the Battalion) towards Quevy. The Battalion numbered now about half its strength in officers and other ranks, and these were already in great need of rest, having been on the move since the morning of the 22nd.

Exactly at what hour the Battalion reached Quevy it is impossible to say but having arrived at the village the men set to work with their entrenching tools to “scrape” holes ,in the ground, i.e., in official terms “to prepare a defensive position.” Here about noon fresh orders were received to continue the march southwards, on Bavai. “Hardly had we left our ‘sera pings’ when the whole line we had occupied was shelled. This was to a certain extent expected, as a’ Taube’ had been hovering over us, which was apparently signaling to a German battery by means of flare lights. This somewhat hastened our retirement, but our casualties were few. From Bavai we continued the march to Amfroipret, where we bivouacked for the night. Warm day.”

On the left flank of the B.E.F. the 19th Infantry Brigade had retired on Jenlain via Elouges. “The retirement,”. the Brigade diary reports, “was carried out in good order and With little loss. Near Elouges the Brigade was placed under the orders of General Allenby commanding the Cavalry Division. From Elouges the direction was changed S.E., and Jenlain was reached about 4 p m, 13 miles” The village was entrenched.

25th August

There are ” however no records of either battalion of the Middlesex Regiment having engaged the enemy during the 25th.

The 7th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division formed its rear-guard so that the 4th Battalion was out of touch with the enemy all day. The 8th Brigade marched via Wargnies-Le

Ouesnoy-Beaudignies-Solesmes to Caudry, the 9th Infantry Brigade taking a road further east. The 4th Battalion Middlesex set out at 5 a.m., and, though hung up for awhile before starting,

owing to the crossing from east to west of long columns of French troops (Sordet’s Cavalry), eventually reached Caudry, thence on to Audencourt, where very poor billets were obtained. Just

before arriving at Caudry a very severe thunderstorm broke over the troops, and when they reached Audencourt officers and men were drenched to the skin. In the few houses and barns allotted to the Battalion fires were lighted at which wet clothes were dried. The room in which the officers were accommodated was bare of furniture and dirty, and straw was the only bedding

obtainable. The 2nd Royal Scots (right) and the 1st Gordon Highlanders (left) formed the outposts of the 8th Infantry Brigade for the night.

THE BATTLE OF LA CATEAU

26th August, 1914

25th August

Whatever hopes the troops of the 2nd Corps (who throughout the 25th had been fighting and retiring) entertained of a night’s rest on the Le Cateau-Cambrai line they were doomed to disappointment. For although a number of units had reached the new line during the evening, many others did not reach their allotted areas until late at night or in the early hours of the 26th.

In the battalions and lower formations another battle next day was fully expected, though at G.H.Q., and amongst the Staff generally, it was early recognised that such a battle would be fraught with the greatest danger to the B.E.F. And, indeed, the tired and weary troops were not all settled in their billets and bivouacs before orders were issued to continue the retirement at the earliest possible moment. “Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le  Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had during the 25th* been partially prepared and entrenched, I had grave doubts, owing to the information I received, as to the accumulating  strength of the enemy against met and as to the wisdom of standing there to fight. ” Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy’s Western Corps (IInd)! to envelop me, and more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I could put some  substantial obstacle such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy and  afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganisation.  Orders were therefore sent to the Corps Commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could towards the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont. The Cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the· retirement. “

Sir John French had, in fact, issued orders ~t 7.30 p.m. for the continued retirement to begin as soon as possible. There was no doubt as to the close proximity of the enemy in great force; the 1st Corps was attacked at Maroilles and Landrecies, just as Sir Douglas Haig’s troops were settling down for the might; earlier, .the lInd Corps had been struck at Solesmes: there was no time to lose.

At 10.15 p.m. the lInd Corps Commander (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) had, in accordance with Sir John French’s orders, issued instructions for the retreat to be continued on the following morning, the transport to start at 4 a.m., and the main bodies at 7 a.m. Later, however, as the true situation revealed itself, Sir Horace saw that such a retirement was Impossible: his troops, some of which at that hour were still coming in, were too exhausted: Allenby’s Cavalry was scattered and could not be collected in time to cover the retirement, and the enemy was m possession of the high ground and the ridges about it, north of Viesly, which would have to be recaptured by the cavalry in order to cover the initial stages of the retreat.

26th August

There was, m fact, no option left him but to stand and fight and, at 3.30 a.m., a message was sent from lInd Corps Headquarters (at Bertry) to G.H.Q., then at St. Quentin, by motor car informing Sir John French of the situation, and the determination of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien to give battle to the enemy. Sir John’s reply contained the following: “If you can hold your ground, the situation appears likely to improve. 4th Division must co-operate. French troops are taking offensive on right of 1st Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method, this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so.”

Some units of the lInd Corps appear to have received orders to stand and fight at various times between 3.30 a.m. and 6 a.m. on 26th, others did not receive them until they were formed up ready to move off southwards at 7 a.m. in accordance with previous instructions, not indeed until the enemy’s artillery had opened fire from gun positions three miles N.N.E. of Le Cateau. With the firing of these guns-the first on that now historic day-the battle opened. The hour was just after 6 a.m., and at that period the approximate position of the B.E.F. was as follows: The right of the line, the 1st Corps, had already set out from Le Grand Fayt-Marbaix-Dammerre (1st  Division) and Landrecies-Maroilles-Noyelles (2nd Division) on its retirement southwards, and  was some miles east and south-east of Le Cateau when the battle opened. Of the 5th Division, IInd Corps, the 14th Infantry Brigade was split up, half lying east and half west of the town of Le Cateau, the 13th Infantry Brigade was just west of the Roman Road (i.e., Montay-Reumont Road), and the 15th Infantry Brigade held Troisvilles: of the 3rd Division, the 9th Brigade held Inchy, the 8th Brigade Audencourt and the 7th Brigade Caudry. The 4th Division, on the line Fontaine au Pire-Haucourt, covered the left of the lInd Corps. The 19th Infantry Brigade was in Le Cateau. Only cavalry operated in the very considerable gap between the 1st and lInd Corps. Portions of the 2nd, 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades and the 4th Cavalry Brigade were at Le Cateau, Troisvilles, Beaumont and Ligny respectively. In these positions battle was joined with the enemy.

At dawn the” trenches,” which had been prepared by civilians under military supervision, in  front of Audencourt were improved and further fresh trenches dug by troops of the 8th Infantry Brigade, who, it will be remembered, had passed the night of 25th-26th in that village. Before dawn picquets had been pushed forward to north of the main road from Le Cateau to Cambrai. Daylight found the 8th Brigade occupying the following positions: 2nd Royal Scots, right of the line; 1st Gordon Highlanders, left of the line; two companies Royal Irish Regiment prolonging and strengthening the line of the Gordon Highlanders towards Caudry, the remaining two  companies in reserve in a sunken road passing from south of Audcncourt through the north of the village; one company 4th Middlesex Regiment in the front line 4rJt to prolong the line of the 2nd  Royal Scots and connect the Battalion. latter with 9th Brigade, one company on the rising  ground in rear of 2nd Royal Scots, firing over the heads of the latter, and the remaining  companies in reserve in the eastern corner of Audencourt.

About 6 a.m. the picquets fell back and shortly after, German shells began to fall, but did so little harm that the men continued working on the trenches. Then, about two thousand yards away, the German infantry could be seen advancing in thin lines down towards the Le Cateau-Cambrai road. They were too far off to be engaged by riflemen, but the divisional artillery opened fire and the gunners burst their shrapnel beautifully amongst the enemy’s troops, scattering them in all directions and strewing the ground with dead and wounded. For two or three hours the infantry of the 8th Brigade lay in their” scrapings ” in the ground watching the duel between the British and German artillery and the splendid shooting of the former whenever bodies of hostile infantry presented a favourable target. Then, about 9 a.m. the machine gunners of the 4th Middlesex and the Royal Scots found targets in small bodies of Germans who were attempting to cross the Cambrai road. But for several hours the fighting was of a desultory nature and, while the 7th Brigade in Caudry was more heavily attacked, the enemy along the whole front of the 3rd Division seemed to be husbanding his strength for a later effort.

Indeed, an officer of the 4th Middlesex said: “Everything went merrily for us until about 4.30 pm when word came down the line that the Germans had broken through one of our divisions and the order was given to retire”

The 4th Middlesex appears to have withdrawn at 5 pm without incident to Vermand, having lost all its transport and horses which with the Brigade Transport had been parked in a farm yard at Audencourt, and totally destroyed by enemy’s shell fire.

 

Taken from the Regimental History of the Middlesex Regiment “The Die-Hards in the Great War” by Everard Wyrall.